Being able to compute a Nash equilibrium in the first place requires a utility function, which is a pretty dubious proposition in practice (how many credits to each player is a random access worth at any given time? How about stealing an agenda? how do we compensate for the non-linear utility of credits for each player?). You can come up with some heuristics to get you close to an unexploitable strategy (or a minimax strategy, or maximal EV strategy vs. a given range of strategies, or whatever your goal is), but it’s not realistic to act like players will be playing equilibrium strategies (and even if they were computable/known, it’s arguable that they should not be playing those strategies, but instead trying to exploit their opponents deviation from equilibrium).
edit: This is a similar situation to poker: Nash equilibria obviously exist (and are even known in certain situations), but the real skill in poker is not finding/memorizing a fold-shove table or whatever, but in determining your opponent’s actual strategy (which is almost always never at equilibrium) and maximally exploiting it.